

SYLLABUS FOR PHILOSOPHY 444

Purposes of the course:

1. To study the development of Western philosophy.
2. To develop a capacity for personal interaction with that philosophy.
3. To evaluate its relationship to Christian apologetics.
4. To construct one's position on the extent of knowledge possible from general revelation.

Texts:

1. *History of Philosophy*, Abernathy and Langford
2. *Pascal's Pensees*
3. *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, Sartre
4. Selections xeroxed from Wittgenstein, Ayer, Austin, Camus, Lewis, Dooyeweerd

Requirements:

1. To read and answer questions over weekly assignment. You should indicate you have done this by submitting a 3x5 card before each class with your name, the date, and the extent of your reading on it.
2. To be prepared to interact with (defend, question, criticize) the week's material in class.
3. To submit two 500-word essays wherein a topic tangent both to that particular week's philosophy and to the Christian faith is displayed. The aspect of philosophy should be evaluated both internally and "externally." Internally, you must ask if it is self-consistent and coherent in itself and corresponding to reality (as known apart from special revelation). Externally, you must ask if it is biblical. This should be turned into my office at least 30 minutes before the class dealing with that philosopher.
4. To take a final exam over the material covered in class.

Determination of grade:

1. Weekly assignments and class interaction - 1/2
2. Essays - 1/4
3. Exam - 1/4
4. Note: One reading assignment and two class periods (4 hours) may be missed without penalty. Other reading assignments missed may reduce your grade, though if completed at a later date, will receive partial credit. Because absences beyond the 4 class hours will be penalized, attendance of classes is always to your advantage, even if the reading has been missed. A total of 6 missed class hours will warrant one letter reduction; 8 missed hours, a two-letter reduction, etc.

Assignments:

1. Sept. 3 Introduction of course
2. Sept. 10 Plato, pp. 46-54, pp. 67-96
3. Sept. 17 Aristotle, pp. 121-149
4. Sept. 24 Epicurus and Epictetus, pp. 183-223
5. Oct. 1 Plotinus and Augustine, pp. 224-237, pp. 238-260
6. Oct. 8 Anselm and Aquinas, pp. 261-265, pp. 266-292
7. Oct. 15 Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, pp. 317-336, pp. 359-378, pp. 409-431
8. Oct. 22 Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, pp. 386-408, pp. 430-457, pp. 477-490
9. Oct. 29 Kant, pp. 491-528
10. Nov. 5 Pascal (see questions)
11. Nov. 12 Hegel, pp. 529-550. Lewis, "Historicism" in supplement
12. Nov. 19 Wittgenstein, Ayer, Austin, Russell-Copleston debate--all in supplement
13. Nov. 26 Sartre, *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, pp. 9-51. Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus," in supplement
14. Dec. 3 Lewis, excerpts from *Miracles*, in supplement
Doozeweerd, two lectures from *The Twilight of Western Thought*, in supplement
15. Dec. 10 Lewis and Dooyeweerd continued
16. Dec. 16-20 Final Exam Week

Essays:

- 1.
- 2.

Bibliography of Bibliographies:

Brown, Colin. *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*. Chicago: Inter-Varsity Press, 1969. This helpful survey of philosophy has a lengthy annotated bibliography at the end of the book.

Copleston, Frederick. *A History of Philosophy*. 8 Vol. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946-1965. Each volume has a lengthy bibliography over that particular period.

Edwards, Paul, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. New York and London: MacMillan and Free Press, 1967.

Stumpf, Samuel Enoch. *Socrates to Sartre*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. The bibliography at the end of this survey of philosophy is not quite as lengthy as Copleston. Nevertheless, it has the advantages of (1) distinguishing original sources from secondary sources and (2) distinguishing paperback works from hardback. The author has tried to include a maximum of the paperback works because they would be more accessible financially to the average student.

II. PLATO, pp. 46-54, 67-96

Excerpt from *The Republic*

1. What kind of philosophical problem is introduced by the notion of the good? By the recollection theory?
2. Would you identify Plato's Idea of the Good with the notion of God? Why or why not?
3. Is the Idea of the Good a cause of being as well as a cause of knowledge and truth?
4. Evaluate Plato's theory of recollection as an adequate explanation of our knowledge of eternal ideas.
5. What function do the senses play in the Platonic theory of the knowledge of the good?

The Meno

1. What are Meno's successive definitions of virtue, and what fault does Socrates find with them?
2. What significance can you see in the kind of definition Socrates is seeking? Does he make any metaphysical assumptions?
3. How would you answer Meno's paradox as stated by Socrates? (p. 77, lines 17-21) Is there a theory of knowledge underlying the assertion of the paradox?
4. What is the distinction between knowledge and true opinion?

III. ARISTOTLE, pp. 121-149

Categories

1. Do you think Aristotle is clearly revealed an empiricist? (p. 124, para. 1)
2. What is primary substance? What are qualities of substance? Can we articulate this in terms of unity and diversity?

Posterior Analytics

1. How does Aristotle further reveal his empiricism in this excerpt?

Metaphysics

1. Articulate Aristotle's four causes. (p. 31, para. 3; p. 137, para. 1ff)
2. As you read, note a few instances where Aristotle argues against Platonism.

IV. EPICURUS and EPICETETUS, pp. 183-199, pp. 202-217

Epicurus: *Letter to Herodotus*

1. Is the epistemology of Epicurus closer to Plato or Aristotle? To what do his "properties or accidents" correspond in Aristotle? (p. 184)
2. Is Epicurus familiar with the first law of thermodynamics? (p. 184, para. 4)
3. Is he aware of the second law of thermodynamics? (p. 186, para. 2)
4. How accurate is his description of hearing? (p. 187, bottom) With what kind of philosophical problem is he working?
5. How modern is the conception of atomic movement? (p. 190, para. 1)
6. How does the physics of Epicurus preserve men from fear? (pp. 193-195)

Principal Doctrines

1. Is the popular notion of Epicureanism consistent with the original source? (p. 196, #5, #17)
2. How is Epicurus' notion of pleasure distinct from the Christian one? (#33)

Epictetus: *Encheiridion*

1. How does the Christian's response to providence differ from Epictetus' reaction to circumstance? (#2, #11, #21, #26)

2. How would you reply to the argument of Epictetus in paragraphs #12, #16, #41?
3. Can you detect the underlying heathen morality structure? (#10, #18, #40)
4. Should we who are discouraged with philosophy at this point reread #22, #23?
5. What do you think of #29 as a "call to discipleship?" Of #46 as exhibiting discipleship?
6. How similar to a Christian ethic is #33? Think carefully through it.
7. Draw analogies from paragraphs #49, #51, #52 to seminary studies.
8. In what way is Epicurus' physics related to his ethics?

V. PLOTINUS and AUGUSTINE, pp. 224-237, pp. 238-260

Plotinus

1. What kind of dualism is evident in his thought? Can this be supported by the Christian doctrine of creation?
2. How would you sketch Plotinus' understanding of man's predicament, deliverance, and means to deliverance? (p. 226)
3. Is the material world eternal? Why do you think this is necessary to his thought?
4. Is there a priority of Spirit over matter in the Scriptures?
5. Is the good of a higher order than mind? (p. 230, para. 1)
6. Is the highest category of his thought "logical" or personal? (p. 235, bottom ff)
7. What similarity have the goals of Eastern pantheistic thought (Hinduism/Buddhism) and Plotinus? (p. 236)

Augustine: *Soliloquy*

1. What is the essence of man according to Augustine? (p. 239) Is this biblical?
2. What similarity has Augustine to Plato in the *Soliloquy*?
3. How do you think knowledge of God differs from knowledge of mathematics?

The Trinity

1. Notice the concluding paragraph for later comparison to Descartes. (pp. 246-247)

City of God: Book XI

1. What is the image of God according to Augustine? (p. 247)
2. Evaluate the apologetic of Evodius. (p. 250, line 27 ff) Is it a biblical apologetic?

Book III

1. Evaluate the statement "Don't you see that you will have to be careful lest someone say to you that, if all things of which God has foreknowledge are done by necessity and not voluntarily, his own future acts will be done not voluntarily but by necessity?" (p. 253)
2. Is foreknowledge equal to foresight in Augustine and/or Scripture?
3. Is there an explanation for the evil will which arose in man and led to sin?

VI. ANSELM and AQUINAS, pp. 261-265, pp. 266-292

Anselm

1. State the ontological argument in a syllogism.
2. Does Anselm successfully counter Guanilon's objection?

Aquinas

1. Why did Plato identify what was abstract in the understanding with what was abstract in reality? (p. 269, 3rd paragraph)
2. Is it true that knowledge "begins in sense?" Is he overlooking the preconditions of knowledge? (p. 269)
3. What are the three intellectual operations? Is this an accurate description of reasoning and reason?
4. Is Aquinas a consistent empiricist in maintaining that the idea of God is innate and, also, that the ontological argument is valid? (p. 279)
5. Evaluate his argument for the existence of God from the existence of truth? (p. 280, para. 1)
6. Evaluate his reply to objection 1. (p. 282, para. 1)
7. What are the five sources of his ways of demonstrating the existence of God? (pp. 283-284) Which of these is most convincing to you? Why?

8. Evaluate the assertion of Aquinas that nature is "the cause of the concrete justice." (p. 286)
9. Critice the statement, "The precepts of the law of nature are related to practical reason in the same way that the first principles of demonstration are to speculative reason." (p. 287)
10. How would you adjust his treatment of how we know the natural moral law?

VII. DESCARTES, SPINOZA and LEIBNIZ, pp. 317-336, pp. 359-378, pp. 409-431

Descartes

1. What kinds of things does Descartes doubt in his first meditation?
2. Is his "evil spirit" an hypothesis sufficient to make him doubt all things?
3. What is the essence of man according to Descartes? Is this biblical?
4. How does Descartes convince himself that his idea of God stems from the reality of God? How might he therefore infer the reality of corporeal objects?

Spinoza

1. Do you agree with Axiom III, proposition VII, proposition IX and proposition XI? Where did Spinoza err in the ontological argument? How did this lead to pantheism? Has he reckoned with the second law of thermodynamics?
2. Spinoza seems to deny that God has either body or mind. (p. 367) Is he consistent with this denial? Is God always non-personal to him?

Leibniz

1. Do you think Leibniz is aware of the equivalence of matter to energy? (p. 407. See also #76)
2. What do Leibniz's proofs for the existence of God have in common with Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza? (pp. 413-414, #38, #45)

3. What are the two great principles upon which our reasonings rest? What is meant by "sufficient reason?" (p. 413)
4. How do paragraphs 53-55 answer the problem of evil?
5. Why and how does the unity and diversity of the universe bring glory to its Creator? (#56-#59)
6. Could you express #62 in your own words?
7. Evaluate his famous Theodicy, noting a couple of positives and negatives.

VIII. LOCKE, BERKELEY and HUME, pp. 386-408, pp. 430-457, pp. 477-490

Locke

1. What are the two "fountains of knowledge" according to Locke? (p. 387) How do these two fountains compare to the two foundational principles of Leibniz? (p. 413)
2. Do you perceive a circular argument in his substantiation of the claim, "The mind can neither make nor destroy them [the sources of simple ideas]." (p. 388. Also p. 400, #4)
3. Define idea, quality, primary quality, secondary quality. (p. 389) Does he make a legitimate distinction between primary and secondary qualities?
4. What is the "substratum" of a thing? (p. 393)
5. Does Locke anywhere account for the "perception" of rationality or ultimate moral axioms?
6. Evaluate his explanation of the idea of God. (p. 396, #33)
7. Have you any criticisms of his discussion on faith and reason?

Berkeley

1. How does Berkeley disagree with Locke concerning "substratum," concerning the distinction between primary and secondary qualities? (p. 432, #7; p. 433, #9)
2. Are you convinced by his argument that number is entirely the creation of the mind? (p. 434, #12) Likewise, concerning "unity?" (p. 434, #13)

3. Do not read past p. 440, #34 until you have jotted down your principle objections to his position. Then proceed, noticing he anticipates and answers at least thirteen objections. For the statements of the objections, see #34, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58, 60, 67. You may wish to scan his anticipated objections to determine if he anticipated yours. Then see if he satisfactorily answers yours particularly.

Hume

1. What are his three principles of connection among ideas? (p. 462)
2. What is the essential difference between relations of ideas and matters of fact? (p. 463)
3. On the basis of what principle is a matter of fact derived? (p. 464)
4. What is the source of this principle? Is this a circular argument? What is the alternative to his source? (p. 464)
5. If it is true that "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience," can it still be true that cause/effect is an *a priori* category of the mind? (p. 465)
6. What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? (pp. 468-470)
7. Just in passing, are we ever guilty of the vice described on p. 473, lines 8-12?
8. Notice that the first two paragraphs of p. 474 function as a kind of summary of his view and its implications. How would you criticize his view on the basis of this example?
9. What is the foundational principle of experiential inference? (p. 474)

10. To what schools of philosophy do Cleanthes, Demea and Philo belong?

11. Does Philo successfully refute the argument from design by rendering its foundational principle of cause and effect inapplicable?

12. Is he successful in refuting the *a priori* argument of Demas?

IX. KANT, pp. 491-528

Prolegomena

1. Evaluate Kant's brilliant and poetic summary of Hume on p. 493, lines 23-28. Would anyone care to exegete it for me?
2. It is worth noticing that Kant's evaluation of Hume's critics could in principle be an evaluation of critics in other fields where a new insight is offered by someone. (p. 494, para. 2-3)
3. Why should one not appeal to common sense as if it were an "oracle?" (p. 292) Is he right?
4. Kant is often criticized as being obscure. Yet I believe it is the subject matter and not his writing that is difficult, for when he introduces his non-technical prolegomena (491-495), he appears, at least to me, to be quite clear and even stylistically pleasing. This should be an encouragement to persevere through the difficult technical aspects of his work; for they are likely difficult not because he is a poor or muddled thinker, but because the subject matter is simply difficult.
5. Define and give examples of (1) analytic judgment and (2) synthetic judgment. What is the principle behind each one? (496-497)
6. Why are mathematical judgments synthetic. (Frankly, I have a hard time grasping his argument here.) (pp. 497-498)
7. Is this "synthetic *a priori*" judgment a new classification? Why would it be important?
8. What is the essential subject of metaphysics? (p. 502)
9. Note that para. 1, p. 503 summarizes his conclusions and paves the way for the task undertaken in the *Critique*.

10. Why are space (506-507) and time (508-509) considered *a priori* preconditions of empirical knowledge?
11. What is the transcendental principle of the unity of all the manifold of our representatives? (p. 512)
12. The difficulty of Kant's discussion "of the relation of the understanding to objects in general, and the possibility of knowing them *a priori*" is increased because it is only a part of the whole. If is, of course, an excerpt and what went before it undoubtedly paved the way for a clearer understanding of his terms. Pay close attention, therefore, to his summary definitions at the beginning. Also notice especially his summary paragraphs which enable you to follow the flow of his argument. (p. 515, lines 21-25; p. 516, para. #1 and #2)
13. What is the definition of the understanding? (p. 516)
14. How can Kant say that "however exaggerated therefore and absurd it may sound, that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and of its formal unity, such a statement is nevertheless correct and in accordance with experience?" (p. 517)

Ethics

1. Why is nothing unconditionally good except a good will? Do you agree? (pp. 518-519)
2. What would be examples of acts done from duty as against those done according to duty? (p. 522)
3. Do you agree with his first proposition--"to have moral worth an action must be done from duty?" (pp. 522-523)

4. To what kind of law ought the will be always subject? (p. 525) Is this a valid criterion?
Is it comprehensive enough to include all legitimate moral maxims?

5. Why is a lying promise incompatible with the moral law?

X. PASCAL

Pensees

1. How biblical is his view of the nature of man? (p. 19, #4; p. 34, #145-148; pp. 49-50, #171-172; p. 50, #174; p. 55; p. 60; p. 60, #199-200; p. 61, #205; p. 64, #229; p. 97, #347-348)
2. Why might the existentialists claim Pascal? (pp. 49-50, #171-172; p. 78, #278; p. 79, #282; p. 93, #331; p. 107, #397; p. 110, #416)
3. Evaluate his position on the "great wager." (p. 65, #233 - p. 69)
4. How does Pascal regard the argument from design? (p. 71, #242; p. 72, #243)
5. What is "reason?" (p. 78, #273)
6. In a sense #277 is a famous paragraph, often quoted by the existentialists. What are its possible interpretations?
7. What is the "heart?" (p. 78, #278; p. 79, #282)
8. Just in passing, notice the frequent references to election and irresistable grace. (e.g. p. 80, #284)
9. Also, on justice and power, there is nothing as lucid and clear. (p. 85, #298)
10. Note his own testimony to Jesus Christ. (p. 146, #546; p. 147, #549)
11. Read all of sections 11 and 12.

12. Finally, from your readings try to sketch a consistent synthesis of Pascal's apologetic.

XI. HEGEL

1. Where does Spirit display itself in its most concrete reality? (p. 529)
2. What are the three topics discussed in the reading? (p. 530)
3. What is the essence of Spirit? What is the nature of freedom? (p. 530) How then can man ever be free?
4. How meaningful is his definition of Universal History?
5. Critically evaluate the presuppositions behind his statement that "the history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom." (p. 531)
6. What is the "nature of God?" (p. 532) Remember, in history, Spirit is making actual what it is potentially.
7. What are the means of the World Spirit for attaining its object? (p. 536)
8. What is a World Historical individual? How does he resemble an anti-christ? How might Hitler have found encouragement from Hegel? (pp. 540-542)
9. Evaluate p. 545, lines 18-22.
10. How are the Common Will and Morality of the State related? How could this give birth to totalitarianism? How would you argue against such a cluster of assertions? (pp. 546-547)
11. Read Lewis' *Historicism*. What are his principal arguments against Hegelian historicism?

XII. Analytic Philosophy: WITTGENSTEIN, AYER, AUSTIN,
RUSSELL/COPELSTON debate

Wittgenstein (#2, 4, 6, 7, 9 in book)

1. Precisely what does Wittgenstein mean by "the language game?" Give an example.
2. Comment on Wittgenstein's statement that "philosophical problems arise when language goes on a holiday."
3. What meaning do you attach to Wittgenstein's statement: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about.'?"
4. Discuss Wittgenstein's statement that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement.
5. What do you suppose is meant by the statement: "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."?

Ayer (#2, 3, 4, 5, 7 in book)

1. Upon what grounds does Ayer attack metaphysics? What criterion does he formulate which will lead to the rejection of metaphysics?
2. Discuss Ayer's criterion of Verifiability. How and why does he distinguish between Verifiable in principle and in practice?
3. Can the proposition of Verifiability be verified? Discuss the various difficulties such a question might provoke for Ayer.
4. How does Ayer distinguish between Strong and Weak Verifiability? Would a historical proposition (for example, Caesar was assassinated) be an instance of strong or weak verifiability? What of such propositions as "God exists" or "Two and two make four?"

5. Is existence a predicate? State Ayer's position and indicate why he raises this issue?

Austin (#1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 in book)

1. What does Austin mean by the "verification" movement and the "use of language" movement? What is the descriptive fallacy with respect to the nature of utterances?
2. What specific use of language does Austin discuss? Give some original examples and indicate why they are not nonsensical and neither true nor false.
3. Are performative utterances in any way reports on facts? Are they true or false? May they imply that which is true or false? Give an example. Would you classify the utterance "you have been warned" as a performative?
4. Explain the basic distinction between statements and performative utterances. Why may statements as well as performative utterances be subject to infelicities? Explain this in detail and with reference to one of Austin's examples.
5. Are the following sentences performative utterances or statements?
"I argue (urge) that there is no backside to the moon."
"I prophesy (predict) that there is no backside to the moon."
6. Comment on Austin's statement that "the more you think about truth and falsity the more you find that very few statements that we ever utter are just true or false."
7. In what respects does the distinction between performative utterances and statements break down? What is the difference between what an utterance means and its force? Do you think there is any significance to this distinction?

Russell/Copleston

1. Who has the better arguments? Why? Where might one have trapped the other but failed to do so?

XIII. Existentialist philosophy: SARTRE, CAMUS

Camus: *The Myth of Sisyphus*

1. Why is Sisyphus the absurd hero?
2. What is "the hour of consciousness?" (p. 89) What is man's "hour of consciousness?" (p. 90)
3. Why is consciousness necessary for tragedy? (p. 89-90)
4. What is "the rock's victory?" What is the rock's victory in a man's life?
5. Why must one imagine Sisyphus happy?

Sartre, pp. 9-51

1. What do existentialists have in common according to Sartre? (p. 13)
2. Why is his atheistic existentialism more coherent than theistic existentialism? (p. 15)
Do you agree?
3. How does responsibility follow from the doctrine that "existence precedes essence?" (p. 17)
4. How does Sartre conceive of himself as confronted with the choice of Abraham? (p. 19)
5. What is forlornness? (p. 21) How does Dostoevsky agree? (p. 22)

6. Evaluate the last paragraph on page 28.
7. Is Sartre consistent in denying the absoluteness of ethics? (p. 46, lines 14-25, p. 47)
8. Explain "one may choose anything if it is on the grounds of free involvement." (p. 48)
9. Sartre claims that "existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position." (p. 51) Is he in fact consistent?
10. How does the polarity of existentialist and linguistic analysis illustrate the dilemma of modern man? What elements of truth are in both schools of philosophy?

XIV. Christian Philosophy: LEWIS and DOOYEWEERD

Lewis, *Miracles* (excerpts)

1. Why does Lewis omit consideration of polytheism—several self-existent gods? Were these satisfactory reasons? (p. 13)
2. What kind of God might a naturalist accept? (p. 14)
3. Lewis points out that "there is no cutting across from anything. Mr. Pickwick says in *Pickwick Papers* to anything Mrs. Gamp hears in Martin Chuzzlewit." What is he illustrating by this observation? (p. 15)
4. What does Lewis mean in saying, "It is clear that everything we know, beyond our own immediate sensations, is inferred from those sensations?" (p. 19) Does this contradict the first six lines of page 11?
5. Evaluate the assertions of page 23, lines 8-11. In what sense is it true? In what sense is it false?
6. Why does Lewis state that the relation between Reason and Nature is an Unsymmetrical Relation? (p. 26)
7. What does existence "on one's own" mean? (p. 28)
8. Could Lewis' argument against an Emergent God apply to Hegel's Absolute Spirit?

Dooyeweerd, *Twilight of Western Thought* (excerpts)

1. What does Dooyeweerd mean by "the belief that human theoretical reason is the ultimate judge in matters of truth and falsehood?" (pp. 2, 6)

2. What are reasons which make the dogma of autonomous thought a critical problem? (pp. 2-3)
3. What is Dooyeweerd's threefold division of philosophy? (p. 2, lines 19-21)
4. Is it true that "if all philosophical currents that pretend to choose their starting point in theoretical reason alone, had, indeed, no deeper presuppositions, it should be possible to settle every philosophical argument between them in a purely theoretical way? (p. 3)
5. What is the transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought? (p. 4)
6. What is the inner structure of the theoretical attitude of thought? (p. 6)
7. What are the fundamental modes of our experience?
8. How does a mode differ from a science? (p. 8)
9. Are modes ever experienced separately, i.e., without reference to the other modes? (pp. 9, 10)
10. Are there more fundamental problems than the modal structures of our experience? (p. 11)
11. Dooyeweerd asks, "Does this antithetical relation between the logical aspect and the non-logical aspects of our temporal experience correspond with the internal structure of the latter?" Why does he answer no?
12. What is the first basic problem of the transcendental critique? (p. 12)

13. What mistake did Aristotle make? (pp. 12, 13)
14. Do you agree that common sense experience "lacks entirely that antithetical relation between the logical and the non-logical experiential modes?" (p. 17)
15. What is the difference between the subject-object relation of naive experience and the antithetical relations which characterize the theoretical attitude of thought? (p. 17) How valid is this distinction?
16. Why is naive experience a pre-theoretical datum? (p. 18)
17. What is the second basic problem in the transcendental critique? (p. 18)
18. Why must the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought lead its adherents to an impasse? (p. 19)
19. How many modes of synthesis are possible? What is the inevitable result of synthesis once autonomy is assumed? (p. 20) How does this relate to the problem of the one and the many?
20. In what two ways are the absolutizations of the modal aspects uncritical? (pp. 20-21) What is the real basis for the choice of certain modal aspects as the basis of synthesis, i.e., upon what grounds does one choose to absolutize a certain aspect as the integration point of his synthesis? Or, as Dooyeweerd says, to what does a particular absolutization testify? Can you give illustrations of this from the history of philosophy?
21. Why is it that the concentric direction of theoretical thought upon the human selfhood cannot originate from theoretical reason itself? (pp. 22-23)
22. Where does Kant seek the central reference-point of the theoretical synthesis? (p. 23)

23. Why is it important, do you think, to observe that Kant's transcendental logical "I" (1) is to be distinguished sharply from the empirical ego, the psycho-physical human person; (2) is the general condition of any possible act of thought; (3) has no individuality of any kind? (p. 23)
24. Why did Kant fail in showing a real starting point of the theoretical synthesis? (p. 24)
25. Do you understand why "the *cognito* [I think] from which Kant starts cannot be a merely logical unity?" (p. 24) Explain.
26. What is the third transcendental problem? (p. 25) What is the relationship of the three transcendental problems?
27. Why cannot the "I" be determined by any modal act of our experience? (p. 25)
28. Why must we now carefully consider the human ego? (p. 27)
29. What is the mystery of the central human ego? Does this make sense to you?
30. Why does Buber's central I-thou relation fail to give a positive content to self-consciousness? Can you, nevertheless, see some value from Buber's observation?
31. Notice, just in passing, the concise and brilliant summary of the nature of love page 29, lines 18-31. Because you are familiar with the subject matter, you can easily follow him, yet at the same time you realize he has compressed much in a few words. His philosophical writing is equally compressed. However, because we are not as familiar with philosophical subject matter, we are apt not to be as appreciative of his precision and brilliance.
32. How does the central relation of the human selfhood to God give theoretical thought its central direction?

33. Dooyeweerd's argument reaches a climax with the fourth paragraph of page 30. The fourth and fifth paragraphs comprise his answer to the problem. That answer is clarified as he elaborates on the ramifications of the rejection of his answer. (pp. 31-38) Then in the second part of his lecture he explains the four pre-theoretical motives of Western thought: the Greek form-matter motive, the Christian Creation-Fall-Redemption motive; the scholastic nature-grace motive; the modern humanistic nature-freedom motive. After reading the climax of his argument and the ramifications of its rejection, try to put his answer in your own words.